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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-4037 
 ___________ 
 
 JANICE A. BULLOCK, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
SLOANE TOYOTA INC, ET AL. a/k/a RGS INC.; LEXUS, ET AL.; JOSHUA BAKER, 
ET AL; DELTA COMMUNITY SUPPORTS INC., THEIR AGENTS 
CONTRACTORS, ET AL.; JOSEPH J. AVESA, ESQUIRE, AVERSA & LINN, P.C., 
ET AL.; JOSEPH CHAIKEN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.; JERRY LYONS, ESQUIRE, ET 
AL; FINCOURT B. SHELTON, ESQUIRE; CITY OF PHILADELPHIA COURT, CCP; 
LEE BELFER, ESQUIRE, ET AL; MARGARET E. WENKE, ESQ. AND CONNOR, 
WEBER, OBERLIES, P.C.; MICHAEL S. MIKULSKI; CHRISTOPHER B. SESSA, 
ESQUIRE; GERMAN, GALLAGHER & MURTAGH AND GARY R. 
GREMMINGER, ET AL; PETER A. DUNN, ESQUIRE; DAVID S. WOLF, ESQUIRE, 
ET AL; MARK F. MACDONALD, ESQUIRE; BRADLEY W. WILLIAMSON, 
ESQUIRE 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 10-cv-04196) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel 
 ____________________________________ 
 
February 3, 2011 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to Jurisdictional Defect, or 
Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
 
 Before:  SLOVITER, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 
 ( filed:   March 2, 2011   ) 
 _________ 
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 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Janice Bullock appeals the District Court‟s dismissal of her 
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291
1
 and 
exercise plenary review over the District Court‟s order.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 
220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  Because this appeal presents no substantial question, we will 
summarily affirm the District Court‟s judgment.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 Bullock‟s action comes on the heels of state proceedings that ended unhappily for 
her.  She alleges that she was severely injured in a car accident, and thereafter filed suit in 
the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas.  According to Bullock, her attorney 
settled the case without her authorization, and on February 23, 2006, the case was marked 
settled, discontinued, and ended.  When she learned that this had occurred, Bullock 
claims, she filed a motion to set aside the settlement and reopen the case.  The state court 
denied her motion, and the Superior Court quashed Bullock‟s subsequent appeal.   
 Bullock then filed a complaint in the District Court.  She has named as defendants 
a variety of parties, including the defendants in the original state-court action, her 
                                                 
1
  Although Bullock‟s notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days after the 
District Court‟s order, her appeal is nevertheless timely because the Court‟s order 
explains in full its reasons for denying Bullock‟s motion, and is thus not a separate 
judgment under Rule 58(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Accordingly, the 
judgment is deemed “entered,” for purposes of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) 
on the date when “150 days have run from entry of the order in the civil docket.”  Fed. R. 
App. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii).  Bullock‟s appeal was filed within that 150-day period, and we can 
3 
 
attorney in that action, and the Court of Common Pleas itself.  The precise dimensions of 
the claims that she has asserted are unclear.  At bottom, she seeks to have her personal-
injury claims considered by a jury.   
 The District Court dismissed Bullock‟s complaint pursuant to § 1915(e).  The 
Court concluded that, on the basis of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, it lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction.  See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 
(1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).  Bullock then filed this appeal. 
As noted, Bullock‟s legal claims are somewhat opaque.  To the extent that Bullock 
asked the District Court simply to overrule the order of the Court of Common Pleas 
denying her motion to set aside the settlement agreement, we agree with the District 
Court that the claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  That doctrine deprives 
federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction over claims when “(1) the federal plaintiff 
lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff „complain[s] of injuries caused by [the] state-court 
judgments‟; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) 
the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgments.  Great 
W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)).  
While this doctrine is “narrow,” id. at 169, it encompasses at least some aspects of 
Bullock‟s complaint.  Bullock was unsuccessful in her efforts to have the settlement set 
                                                                                                                                                             
therefore entertain it.  See LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass‟n, 503 F.3d 217, 
224 n.5 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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aside
2
; she argues that by enforcing the settlement, the state court abridged her right to a 
jury trial; the state-court order preceded the federal action; and she is explicitly 
requesting that the federal courts reject the state court‟s disposition of the case.  
Accordingly, this claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.   
Bullock‟s complaint may be read to assert alternative claims.  For instance, 
Bullock may be seeking to prosecute her action anew in federal court, notwithstanding 
the state court‟s judgment.  Such a claim is not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  
See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co., 615 F.3d at 169.  It is, however, barred by the 
doctrine of res judicata.  See Gleash v. Yuswak, 308 F.3d 758, 760 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(concluding that court may raise res judicata on own initiative when its applicability is 
plain).  Under Pennsylvania law, which governs the inquiry, see McCarter v. Mitcham, 
883 F.2d 196, 199 (3d Cir. 1989), “[a]ny final, valid judgment on the merits by a court of 
competent jurisdiction precludes any future suit between the parties or their privies on the 
same cause of action,” Balent v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 669 A.2d 309, 313 (Pa. 1995).  
Bullock makes no attempt to differentiate this action from her proceeding in state court; 
to the contrary, she is intentionally asserting the same claims arising out of her car 
accident.  Although only court-approved settlements are entitled to res judicata effect, the 
state court‟s refusal here to set aside the settlement suffices.  See Bearoff v. Bearoff 
                                                 
2
  We have held that a state court‟s order approving a settlement agreement 
can be the type of state judgment that is subject to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see In re 
GMC Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 133, 143 (3d Cir. 1998), 
and we see no meaningful difference between such an order and the order at issue here.  
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Bros., Inc., 327 A.2d 72, 75 & n.1 (Pa. 1974); cf. Setty v. Knepp, 722 A.2d 1099, 1101 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (concluding that trial court‟s order refusing to reinstate action 
constituted a final order).  Thus, the state court‟s resolution of Bullock‟s personal-injury 
action prevents her from relitigating it in federal court.
3
   
Finally, Bullock‟s complaint can be read to assert a professional-malpractice claim 
against her attorney, who allegedly entered into a settlement agreement without her 
consent.  See generally Rothman v. Fillette, 469 A.2d 543, 545-46 (Pa. 1983) (addressing 
claim that lawyer had settled case without client‟s authorization).  (Bullock makes no 
similar allegations of wrongdoing against other defendants.)  However, while Bullock 
seems to present her claim as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, she has not set forth any 
facts to demonstrate that her attorney was a state actor or acted under color of state law, 
as is required under § 1983.  See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 184 (3d Cir. 1993).  
Further, the complaint states that both Bullock and her attorney are Pennsylvania 
residents, which precludes this Court from exercising diversity jurisdiction over a state-
law malpractice claim.  See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  This claim, therefore, also fails 
in federal court as a matter of law.   
Accordingly, we conclude that there is no substantial question presented by this 
appeal, and will thus summarily affirm the District Court‟s order dismissing Bullock‟s 
complaint.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6
                                                 
3
  We note that we may affirm the District Court‟s judgment on any ground 
supported by the record.  United States v. Sanchez, 562 F.3d 275, 279 (3d Cir. 2009). 
